Guest: Barry Jacobsen, military historian and US Army veteran.....we will discuss the latest on gun control........and other stories.....
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NPR itself confirmed Thursday that it had cut 10% of its workforce on Thursday, impacting roughly 100 employees, adding that it tends to roll back the workforce from 1,200 to an estimated 1,050 employees, the "largest reduction in staff since the 2008 recession.""We literally are fighting to secure the future of NPR at this very moment by restructuring our cost structure. It's that important. It's existential," NPR chief executive John Lansing told NPR's media correspondent David Folkenflik.
If the United States had provided that level of support in 1975, when South Vietnam collapsed in the face of another North Vietnamese offensive, the outcome might have been at least the same as in 1972.
But intense lobbying of Congress by the antiwar movement, especially in the context of the Watergate scandal, helped to drive cutbacks of American aid in 1974.
Combined with the impact of the world oil crisis and inflation of 1973-74, the results were devastating for the south.
As the triumphant North Vietnamese commander, Gen. Van Tien Dung, wrote later, President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam was forced to fight “a poor man’s war.”
Even Hanoi’s main patron, the Soviet Union, was convinced that a North Vietnamese military victory was highly unlikely.No kidding that fear of the U.S. dissipated.
Evidence from Soviet Communist Party archives suggests that, until 1974, Soviet military intelligence analysts and diplomats never believed that the North Vietnamese would be victorious on the battlefield. Only political and diplomatic efforts could succeed.
Moscow thought that the South Vietnamese government was strong enough to defend itself with a continuation of American logistical support.
The former Soviet chargé d’affaires in Hanoi during the 1970’s told me in Moscow in late 1993 that if one looked at the balance of forces, one could not predict that the South would be defeated.
Until 1975, Moscow was not only impressed by American military power and political will, it also clearly had no desire to go to war with the United States over Vietnam.
But after 1975, Soviet fear of the United States dissipated.